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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Martin Edmo Ish appeals from the district court’s Judgment summarily dismissing 
his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.  On appeal, Mr. Ish contends that the district 
court erred in summarily dismissing the petition in its entirety because, with regard to 
one of Mr. Ish’s claims, the evidence was sufficient to raise genuine issues of material 
fact as to whether counsel was ineffective.   
In his post-conviction petition, Mr. Ish asserted that his defense counsel was 
ineffective for requesting a jury instruction that misstated the law and lowered the 
State’s burden of proof with regard to his possession of a controlled substance charge.  
Because the requested jury instruction was given, and the jury convicted Mr. Ish of 
possession of a controlled substance, Mr. Ish has shown defense counsel’s error was 
prejudicial.   
The petition was summarily dismissed by the district court without an evidentiary 
hearing.  The district court held that the instruction was correct and that Mr. Ish could 
not raise a post-conviction claim that the jury instructions were incorrect based on 
Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360 (1996).  However, such was error as Idaho precedent 
allows this claim to be pursued in post-conviction and the appellate courts have found 
deficient performance by counsel in several cases where the jury was erroneously 
instructed.  Therefore, the district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on 
the claim.   
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 2012, Mr. Ish was charged with possession of methamphetamine for residual 
traces of methamphetamine found in a three-inch long straw that was located in his 
pants pocket.1  (Trial Tr., p.133, L.23 – p.134, L.2; R.39487, p.37.)  At trial, defense 
counsel requested a jury instruction on the elements of possession of a controlled 
substance that included language that Mr. Ish “knew or should have known” that he 
possessed methamphetamine.  (R.39847, p.138.)  The district court gave a modified 
version of the instruction requested by defense counsel, and the jury found Mr. Ish guilty 
of possession of a controlled substance.  (Trial Tr., p.247, Ls.15-23; p.257, L.17 – 
p.258, L.7.) 
Mr. Ish was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and a persistent 
violator sentencing enhancement.  (R., p.5.)  Mr. Ish was sentenced to twelve years, 
with four years fixed.  (R., p.5.)  Mr. Ish appealed from the judgment.  (R., p.5.)  On 
appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated Mr. Ish’s conviction for the persistent 
violator sentencing enhancement.  (State v. Martin Ish, Dkt. No. 39847, 2014 
Unpublished Opinion No. 433, Idaho Court of Appeals, March 28, 2014; R., p.5.)  
Mr. Ish was resentenced to seven years, with three years fixed.  (R., p.241.) 
On July 29, 2014, Mr. Ish filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, inter 
alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective for requesting an erroneous jury instruction 
                                            
1 Officer Eric Miller testified it was, based on his training and experience, a straw that 
would be used for snorting some sort of drug.  (Trial Tr., p.134, Ls.3-8.)  
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that, Mr. Ish “knew or should have known that what was in that baggie was 
methamphetamine.”2  (R., pp.6-120.)   
The State filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal with a supporting 
brief in which the State addressed Mr. Ish’s claims.  (R., pp.156-170.)  In its motion for 
summary dismissal, as for the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the State 
generally argued that Mr. Ish had not overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s 
assistance was adequate and that all decisions were made with the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment, particularly where his counsel filed a motion to 
suppress on which it prevailed, in part.  (R., pp.168-69.)  The State claimed that Mr. Ish 
failed to establish all the essential elements for which he bore the burden of proof, and 
the petition should be dismissed.  (R., p.169.)  The State also requested that the district 
court take judicial notice of the entire underlying criminal file.  (R., pp.170-171.) 
In response, Mr. Ish filed a brief denying the State’s contentions made in the 
motion to dismiss.  (R., pp.152-155.)   
Thereafter, the district court issued a written decision in which it dismissed 
Mr. Ish’s post-conviction petition.3  (R., pp.238-249.)   
The district court summarily dismissed all of the claims, including the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.  (R., pp.244-248.)  As for Mr. Ish’s claim that his counsel 
                                            
2 Mr. Ish’s post-conviction petition alleged numerous evidentiary errors and errors by his 
trial counsel which are not set forth herein.  (R., pp.6-120.)  Mr. Ish will instead focus on 
the issue of whether the district court erred in dismissing his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for requesting an erroneous jury instruction on the elements of 
possession of a controlled substance. 
3 Therein, the district court considered both the underlying criminal case as well as the 
criminal appeal.  (R., p.238.)  For ease of reference, Mr. Ish shall refer to the transcript 
of the September 8, 2011 trial from the underlying criminal case, as “Trial Tr.” and the 
clerk’s record from the appeal as “R.39847.” 
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was ineffective for erroneously recommending the “knew or should have known” 
language in the jury instruction, the district court found the jury instruction telling the jury 
Mr. Ish was guilty of possessing a controlled substance if he “knew or should have 
known” the substance was methamphetamine was a correct statement of the law and 
any claims as to the correctness of jury instructions, which could have been challenged 
on appeal but were not, are waived pursuant to Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360 (1996).  
(R., p.248.)  The district court also found, as to all claims of ineffective assistance, 
Mr. Ish did not show how he was prejudiced and how the outcome would have been 
different.  (R., p.248.)  The court granted the motion for summary dismissal.  (R., p.248.) 
Thereafter, the district court entered a final judgment.  (R., pp.250-251.) 
Mr. Ish filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s dismissal of the 
petition.  (R., pp.252-255, 261-265.) 
 
 8 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Ish’s Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Ish’s Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 Mr. Ish established that issues of material fact existed as to his assertions that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for requesting a jury instruction which lowered the 
prosecution’s burden of proof and was directly contradicted by Idaho case law.  In 
support of his claims, Mr. Ish submitted evidence and a sworn affidavit.  The district 
court summarily dismissed Mr. Ish’s claim, finding that the instruction was correct, that a 
claim of erroneous jury instructions may not be raised in post-conviction pursuant to 
Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360 (1996), and that Mr. Ish had not established prejudice or 
how the outcome would have been altered.  However, the jury instruction was 
erroneous, the facts of Cootz v. State are distinguishable, and Mr. Ish presented prima 
facie evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding this issue and 
demonstrated a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s errors, the result of the 
trial would have been different.  As such, Mr. Ish certainly should have been allowed an 
evidentiary hearing on the claim, and the district court erred when it summarily 
dismissed the post-conviction petition in its entirety. 
 
B. Post-Conviction Jurisprudence 
 
A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is separate and distinct from the underlying 
criminal action which led to the petitioner’s conviction.  Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 
456 (1991).  It is a civil proceeding governed by the Uniform Post- Conviction Procedure 
Act (hereinafter, UPCPA) (I.C. §§ 19-4901 to 4911), and the Idaho Rules of Civil 
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Procedure.  Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456.  Because it is a civil proceeding, the petitioner 
must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.  Charboneau v. State, 
144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007).  However, the petition initiating post-conviction proceedings 
differs from the complaint initiating a civil action.  A post-conviction petition is required to 
include more than “a short and plain statement of the claim;” it “must be verified with 
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records 
or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must 
state why such supporting evidence is not attached.”  Id.; I.C. § 19-4903.   
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through 
post-conviction proceedings.  Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25 (Ct. App. 1992).  
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show 
that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient—that the attorney’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988).  
The appellate court presumes that trial counsel was competent “and that trial tactics 
were based on sound legal strategy.”  State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 792 (1997).  Trial 
counsel's tactical decisions cannot justify relief “unless the decision is shown to have 
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review.”  State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561 (2008). 
After a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is shown if there is a 
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceedings would have been different.”  Strickland, at 694; Aragon, at 760.  “A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
 11 
outcome.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  “The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result.”  Id. at 686. 
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the 
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of petitions where there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  
I.C. § 19-4906(c).  In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, the district 
court need not “accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported 
by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.”  Martinez v. State, 126 
Idaho 813, 816-17 (Ct. App. 1995).  Additionally, the district court need not accept those 
of the petitioner’s allegations which are “clearly disproved by the record.”  Cootz v. 
State, 129 Idaho 360, 368 (Ct. App. 1996).  However, if the petitioner presents some 
shred of evidentiary support for his allegations, the district court must take the 
petitioner’s allegations as true, at least until such time as they are controverted by the 
State.  Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646 (1968).  This is so even if the allegations 
appear incredible on their face.  Id.  The district court is required to accept the 
petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but is not required to accept the petitioner’s 
conclusion.  Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903.   
If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted to resolve the factual issues.  Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272 
(Ct. App. 2002).  The United States Supreme Court has defined the standard for 
whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact as whether “the evidence is such 
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that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  “The inquiry performed is the threshold 
inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial – whether, in other words, 
there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either 
party”  Id. at 250.  If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must 
be conducted.  State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008). 
The underlying facts alleged by the petitioner “must be regarded as true” for 
purposes of summary dismissal.  Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 (2009).  Any 
disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, and “all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving 
party.”  Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009). 
Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition does not involve the 
finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations 
of law.  Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court’s summary dismissal 
order de novo.  Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006). 
 
C. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing The Claim Of Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel For Requesting An Erroneous Jury Instruction Which 
Lowered The State’s Burden Of Proof 
 
Mr. Ish asserts that he presented prima facie evidence of ineffective assistance 
of counsel on his post-conviction claims.  Mr. Ish asserted, inter alia, that his trial 
counsel was deficient because counsel requested an erroneous jury instruction on the 
element of possession, and the district court granted the request, and the jury found him 
guilty of possession of a controlled substance.   
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Mr. Ish was charged with possession of a controlled substance under I.C. § 37-
2732(c)(1) which provides, in relevant part: 
(c) It is unlawful for any person to possess a controlled substance unless 
the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid 
prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this chapter. 
 
(1) Any person who violates this subsection and has in his possession a 
controlled substance classified in schedule I which is a narcotic drug or a 
controlled substance classified in schedule II, is guilty of a felony and upon 
conviction may be imprisoned for not more than seven (7) years, or fined 
not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both.  
 
I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) (R.39487, p.37). 
   Possession of a controlled substance is a general intent crime requiring that the 
defendant knowingly possess the substance.  State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 704 
(Ct. App. 2005); State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240 (1999); State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 
926 (1993).  The Idaho Court of Appeals in Stefani noted that, “[t]he purpose of the 
intent element in the definition of a possession offense is to separate innocent, 
accidental, or inadvertent conduct from criminal behavior.”  Stefani, 142 Idaho at 704.      
Here, the State charged Mr. Ish with possessing methamphetamine in violation of 
Idaho Code Section 37-2732(c)(1).  (R.39487, p.37.)  The pattern Idaho criminal jury 
instruction (ICJI) for possession of a controlled substance provides that “[i]n order for 
the defendant to be guilty of Possession of a Controlled Substance, the state must 
prove each of the following: . . . the defendant either knew it was [name of substance] or 
believed it was a controlled substance.”  (ICJI 403.)  Therefore, it was the State’s 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ish knew it was methamphetamine 
or believed it was a controlled substance.  Under this instruction, the jury could not 
convict Mr. Ish if it found he did not know it was methamphetamine or some other 
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controlled substance—even if the jurors believed he should have known it was 
methamphetamine or some other controlled substance. 
Nonetheless, the district court instructed the jury as follows regarding the 
knowledge requirement:   
4. the defendant knew or should have known it was 
methamphetamine or believed it was a controlled substance. 
 
(Trial Tr., p.247, Ls.15-23 (emphasis added).)4   
The district court thus instructed the jury on an incorrect legal standard.  The 
Idaho Supreme Court has previously ordered a new trial in a similar case where the jury 
relied upon an erroneous “knew or should have known” standard to establish the 
defendant’s knowledge.  See State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240-241 (1999). 
In State v. Blake, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court erred in 
giving jury instructions which stated that in order to find the defendant guilty of 
possession of a controlled substance the State must prove that he “knew or should 
have known” that the substance possessed was a controlled substance.  133 Idaho 
237, 240-241 (1999).  The Supreme Court held that this was error, as it allowed the jury 
to convict the defendant using a negligence standard.  Id. at 241.  The Idaho Supreme 
                                            
4 Defense counsel initially requested the jury instruction reading, in pertinent part:   
 
4. the defendant knew or should have known it was methamphetamine. 
 
 (R.39847, p.138 (emphasis added).)  Near the end of trial, the prosecutor requested 
additional language to add the words, “or believed it was a controlled substance” to Jury 
Instruction No. 16.  (Trial Tr., p.235, L.9 – p.236, L.24.)  Defense counsel objected to 
the additional words, but the district court agreed with the prosecutor and added the 
language.  (Trial Tr., p.236, Ls.4-24.)  Notably, the incorrect language of “knew or 
should have known” was still included in the final version.  
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Court vacated the defendant’s conviction and remanded the case with instructions for a 
new trial.  Id. at 243.   
  Here, the district court’s instruction asked the jury to apply the incorrect legal 
standard to establish the element of knowledge and thereby lowered the State’s burden 
of proof.  The jury was left with the impression that it could convict Mr. Ish even if it 
found that he did not realize there was methamphetamine or another controlled 
substance inside the straw, but “should have known” what was in the straw.  Thus, the 
jurors could reasonably have concluded that they were directed to find Mr. Ish guilty of 
possession of a controlled substance without finding that he knew what was in the 
straw.   
In granting the State’s motion for summary dismissal, the district court found that 
the “knew or should have known” instruction was a correct statement of the law and 
Mr. Ish did not raise this issue on appeal.  (R., p.248.)  Further, the district court found, 
under Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360 (Ct. App. 1996), that claims as to the correctness 
of jury instructions which could have been raised on direct appeal but were not, are 
waived and not to be considered in post-conviction proceeding.  (R., p.248.)  However, 
Cootz was a case in which the petitioner claimed that three jury instructions misled him 
to believe that only one sentence enhancement was being sought.  Cootz, 129 Idaho 
364.  Since Cootz, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that a trial attorney was deficient 
for not objecting to an incorrect jury instruction.  McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567 (2010); 
see also Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding defendant met 
his burden in showing his trial attorney was deficient for not objecting to the jury 
instruction that erroneously defined “malice”).  
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In Mr. Ish’s case, where his counsel requested an erroneous jury instruction that 
had been determined erroneous by Idaho case law as far back as 1999, this constituted 
deficient performance and controlling precedent allowed such a claim to be raised in an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a post-conviction case.  Thus, the district 
court’s holding that the instruction was a correct statement of the law and that Cootz 
barred such a claim was erroneous. 
Furthermore, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome 
of the proceedings.  Because of the error, the jury was left with the impression that it 
could convict Mr. Ish even if it found that he did not know what was in the straw.  Had 
this jury been properly instructed, it is likely this jury would have also been unable to 
convict Mr. Ish of the offense.  
Tactical and strategic decisions by trial counsel will not be second-guessed and 
“cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have 
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 382–
83, 247 P.3d 582, 609–10 (2010). In the absence of a showing that counsel was 
unprepared, ignorant of the relevant law, or exhibited any other shortcoming capable of 
objective evaluation, the reviewing court will presume that the decision was one driven 
by tactical or strategic decision making.  Crawford v. State, __ P.3d __, 2016 WL 
1358103, *5 (Idaho Apr. 6, 2016).   
To demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.” Id. at 694.  A reasonable probability is defined as “a 
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probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a 
different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 
U.S. 86 (2011). 
 However, failure to object or bring to the district court’s attention the fact that it 
was incorrectly instructing the jury and simultaneously lowering the prosecution’s 
burden of proof was clearly “ignorance of the relevant law,” as discussed in Shackelford.  
Not only was this error of counsel unreasonable, it had an adverse effect on the 
defense.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.  It was apparent from the jury instruction that 
the jury could convict Mr. Ish based on an improper standard of knowledge.  Where the 
jury was instructed that it could find Mr. Ish guilty based on a negligence standard, this 
removed the burden on the State to prove that Mr. Ish knew or believed the substance 
in the straw was a controlled substance.     
Defense counsel’s failure to object to the erroneous jury instruction can be 
likened to the facts of McKay v. State.  In McKay, the Idaho Supreme Court held that 
McKay’s trial attorney was objectively deficient for failing to object to jury instructions 
which omitted the only disputed element in the case, and there was “no conceivable 
tactical justification for trial counsel’s failure to object.”  148 Idaho 567, 572 (2010).  The 
Court vacated the summary dismissal of Mr. McKay’s application, finding that he had 
established a genuine issue of material fact that trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance; thus, Mr. McKay was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.  Id. 
Similarly, in Sheahan, the jury was instructed on a definition of “malice” that 
Idaho precedent had held was inapplicable long before the defendant’s trial. The Court 
of Appeals noted that, in State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 713 (1970), the Court held that 
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the section 18–101 definition of malice was not to be used in the instructions in a 
murder case.  The Court held that “the incorrect expansion of the definition of malice in 
the jury instruction's second paragraph improperly lowered the State's burden of proof 
on that element of the offense.”  Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 105.  As a result, Mr. Sheahan 
had shown that his attorney’s performance was not “within the range of competence 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases” where he failed to object to the faulty 
instruction.  Id. at 105 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). 
Here, trial counsel made an egregious mistake.  Asking the district court to 
erroneously instruct the jury thereby negating one of the elements the State was 
required to prove, could not fall within the ambient of reasonable representation and 
caused prejudice to Mr. Ish where this Court presumes that a jury followed the jury 
instructions given by the trial court in reaching its verdict.  See State v. Abdullah, 158 
Idaho 386, 445 (2015).   
This instruction was particularly prejudicial in a residue case, where the drug 
amount may be so small as to be invisible to the naked eye.  As the Idaho Court of 
Appeals held, in State v. Groce, 133 Idaho 144, 152 (Ct. App. 1999):   
The greater the amount of a controlled substance found in a defendant's 
possession, the greater the inference of knowledge and control. However, 
under circumstances where the quantity of a controlled substance 
possessed by a defendant is de minimis and there is no other 
circumstantial evidence of possession, the inference of knowledge and 
control is significantly diminished. 
 
Id.  (internal citations omitted).  Thus, asking the jury to convict on a negligence 
standard was problematic when there was just residue in the straw.   
Had an evidentiary hearing been conducted, Mr. Ish would have established that 
the State’s possession case suffered from a lack of direct evidence that Mr. Ish knew 
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there was methamphetamine residue in the straw.  Regardless of whether 
methamphetamine was found in his urine (Trial Tr., p.166, L.23 – p.167, L.3; State’s 
Trial Exhibit 3), Mr. Ish could have obtained a straw with methamphetamine residue that 
he was not aware of and/or could not even see.  Thus, it is apparent that use of the 
negligence standard becomes problematic and prejudicial as Mr. Ish denied using 
methamphetamine and no methamphetamine (other than the residue in the straw) was 
found on his person or in the car.5  (Trial Tr., p.139, Ls.9-16.)  Further, Mr. Ish did not 
admit to having recently possessed or consumed methamphetamine, and in fact he said 
it had been a couple of months since he had last used it.6  (Trial Tr., p.139, Ls.13-16.)  
 In light of all of this, it is readily apparent that there was a tremendous likelihood 
that the jury convicted Mr. Ish on a negligence standard in finding him guilty of 
possession of a controlled substance where he “should have known” the identity of the 
substance in the straw.  
  As such, he asserts that his counsel was ineffective for requesting the 
erroneous jury instruction negating one of the elements the State was required to prove, 
and his counsel’s deficient conduct “so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”  
Strickland, at 686.   
 At the summary dismissal stage, Mr. Ish needed to show there existed a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether his counsel’s deficient conduct “so undermined the 
                                            
5 The jury was instructed not to consider the syringes that were found in the vehicle.  
(Trial Tr., p.125, Ls.20-25; p.127, Ls.3-11.) 
6 While the jury heard that Mr. Ish’s urine contained, inter alia, methamphetamine, there 
was no testimony as to how long methamphetamine takes to dissipate from urine once 
it has been ingested.  (Trial Tr., p.164, L.17 – p.209, L.5.)   
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proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result.”  Strickland, at 686.  He sufficiently established that he was 
entitled to a hearing where he substantiated his allegations with admissible evidence.  
Mr. Ish established that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether his 
counsel was deficient and there was a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient 
conduct, the result of the trial would have been different.  Thus, the district court’s 
dismissal of all of Mr. Ish’s claims was error. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ish respectfully requests that this Court vacate the summary dismissal of his 
post-conviction petition with respect to the issue of whether trial counsel was ineffective 
for requesting an erroneous jury instruction which lowered the State’s burden of proof at 
trial, and remand the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue.  
DATED this 16th day of August, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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